


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SPECIAL SECTION: UKRAINIANS, JEWS AND THE HOLOCAUST

Foes of our rebirth: Ukrainian nationalist discussions about Jews, 1929–1947

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The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, or OUN, came into being in 1929 as an “integral nationalist” movement that set itself the goal of driving Polish landowners and officials out of eastern Galicia and Volhynia, joining hands with Ukrainians in other countries, and establishing an independent state. The OUN defined Jews, along with Russians and Poles, as aliens and enemies. There was no need, wrote an OUN ideologist in 1929, to list all the injuries that Jews caused Ukrainians. “In addition to a number of external enemies Ukraine also has an internal enemy . . . Jewry and its negative consequences for our liberation cause can be liquidated only by an organized collective effort”. The article examines archival documents, publications by OUN members, and recent scholarly literature to trace the evolution of OUN thinking about Jews from 1929 through the war years, when the German occupation of Ukraine gave the OUN an opportunity to stage pogroms and persecute Jews, and the prime minister of the state that the OUN proclaimed wrote that he supported “the destruction of the Jews and the expedience of bringing German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine”.

Keywords: Ukraine; anti-Semitism; Ukrainian nationalism

If nationalism is waging war against mixed marriages insofar as conquerors (especially Poles and Russians) are concerned, then it cannot bypass the problem of mixed marriages with Jews, who are indisputably if not greater, then at least comparable, foes of our rebirth.

Ievhen Konovalets', Leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists

Prague, November 1930: “the government’s task will be to grant Jews equal status”

At a quarter past ten on a frigid morning in January 1929, 30 engineers, teachers, journalists, poets, and students gathered in a conference room at a small hotel on Vienna’s fashionable Kantgasse. Two of them had come as guests. The rest were delegates from clusters of Ukrainian nationalists in Paris, Prague, Berlin, Brussels, Liège, Luxembourg, and Winnipeg. Of the 28, the oldest was 50, the youngest 22. Their average age was 33. Nine were the sons of priests. Nineteen of them had served with one army or another during the Great War. They were the children of war and revolution (Kedryn

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300; Motyl 150; Muravs'kyi, "Uchasnyky" 75–86; Muravs'kyi, *Kongres* 6, 313; Lenkavs'kyi 410; rpt. in Muravs'kyi, *Kongres* 324).

"We have not been defeated! The war is not over!" Colonel Ievhen Konovalets' had fulminated when the Great War ended. "We, the Ukrainian Military Organization, are continuing it . . . Victory lies before us!" (M.P., "Polkovnyk Ievhen Konovalets'" 5).

The Ukrainian Military Organization, or UVO, that Konovalets' established was one of half a dozen nationalist groupings. Together they counted some 1200 members (Anatolii Kentii and Volodymyr Lozyts'kyi, introduction to Konovalets' and Martynets', *Ia b''iu v dzvin* 16). By the late 1920s they recognized that they were facing overwhelming odds and would have to join forces.

Now, at 10am on 28 January 1929, when all the delegates had assembled, Konovalets' walked into the room. He was of medium height, well-built, with an angular face and a wide chin. A good-looking man, though his hair was thinning and he showed bad teeth when he smiled (Fedyna 86–87; rpt. in Muravs'kyi, *Kongres* 330–31; Pytliar 2; Onats'kyi 230).

The delegates took their seats. The colonel began his speech. After defeat in the struggle for liberation, he said, Ukrainian nationalists had lost faith in their leaders. They had not found a place for themselves in any political party. Many were living abroad, but there was no center to unite them. They were giving up hope and siding with the Communists or abandoning politics. This was why the idea of uniting everyone in a single organization had emerged. A conference in November 1927 had established the Leadership. Now, after more than a year of hard work, Konovalets' concluded, the Leadership was handing over to the congress the establishment of an organization and the development of an ideology (Muravs'kyi, *Kongres* 62).

Six days later the men – there was not a woman among them – emerged from the conference room to announce that they had founded the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and approved a program. Their goal? To act as the legal front of the underground UVO and to incite a revolution in the course of which the Ukrainians of Galicia and Volhynia would drive out the Polish landowners and officials, join hands with the Ukrainians on the other side of the Zbruch River, and bring together all their lands – not just those in Poland and the Soviet republics of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus but those smaller pieces of land in Czechoslovakia and Romania as well – in a single state with its own army, security service, and police under a "national dictatorship" (Martynets', "Po Kongresi" 4–7; Muravs'kyi, *Kongres* 315–18).

The methods the nationalists would use to bring about the revolution, to establish themselves as rulers? Conspiratorial and revolutionary. Arson, fire-bombing, robbery and assassination. Their inspiration? The Polish insurrectionists of the 1860s, the Finns, the Irish, Lenin's Bolsheviks, Piłsudski's socialists, Mussolini's Fascists. Violence, terrorism, propaganda, everyone bound together, as one nationalist put it, by a "dictator, a Ukrainian Mussolini" (Kucheruk, "Dmytro Andriievs'ky" 99).

*

Preparing for the founding congress, Konovalets' had written that the "ideological platform of Ukrainian nationalism" should have a section on minorities (Kucheruk, "Dmytro Andriievs'kyi" 86; Cherchenko 25). The resolutions of the congress made no reference to minorities, but a passage about culture and art hinted at the nationalists' thinking: the Ukrainian state would coordinate the cultural process "with the spiritual nature of the Ukrainian people [and] its historical traditions" and eradicate "the evil consequences of foreign enslavement in the fields of culture and the national psyche" (Martynets',

“Postanovy” 177; Knysh, *Stanovlennia* 111). Yet questions about minorities, and especially about the Jewish population in the Ukrainian lands, perhaps the largest in the world in the 1920s and 1930s, emerged in the OUN periodicals *Surma* and *Rozbudova natsii*.

Surma, the bulletin of the OUN, was one of the most popular publications in Galicia. The Polish authorities had banned the bulletin, and distributing it could bring a sentence of five years in prison (Svatko 34). The OUN smuggled *Surma* in from Germany and Lithuania, and dozens or even hundreds of people read every tattered issue (Posivnych, *Stepan Bandera* 9–10).

The assassination of Symon Petliura in Paris in 1926 and the trial of his killer, Samuel Schwartzbard, prompted *Surma* to attack both Schwartzbard and Jews as a whole. The case had shown a feature of the Jewish character, an unsigned article announced. “All of Israel” had leaped to defend Schwartzbard, and at the proceedings:

there came to the surface not only the shared Jewish blood, which tells every Jew to defend his co-religionist . . . but also the Jewish ethic that orders Jews to use any means to obtain their ends . . . The Jewish soul has remained the same. They did not hesitate to declare that Petliura and Ukrainian military units, which had often defended Jews from pogromist detachments, had incited the pogroms (“Paryzh’s’kyi protses” 5–6).

Even as *Surma* defended Petliura against the charge of responsibility for pogroms, it also justified the pogroms themselves:

Jewish behavior toward the Ukrainian population, their Russifying and Polonizing mission, engendered the hatred of the Ukrainian population for the Jews and created the grounds for the pogroms, against which the small Ukrainian army was helpless. Instead of engaging in theatrical poses and shedding tears, the Jews and the defenders and supporters of Schwartzbard should have beaten themselves on the chest and accepted part of the responsibility for the pogroms . . . (“Paryzh’s’kyi protses” 6)

The attack on Jews in *Surma* did not differ greatly from those that the mainstream press published – it, too, spoke about Jewish depravity and duplicity – but the articles that began to appear in *Rozbudova natsii*, the ideological journal of the UVO and OUN, went further (Redlich 236–38).¹ The UVO had established *Rozbudova* in 1928. Its publisher was Mykola Stsibors’kyi, its editor Volodymyr Martynets’. The people around the journal sometimes argued for months until they had hammered out a programmatic point, and views that were published in *Rozbudova* were not subject to further discussion (Martynets’, *Ukrains’ke pidpillia* 283).

Makar Kushnir, journalist and delegate to the founding congress of the OUN, started the discussion about Jews in *Rozbudova* on the eve of the OUN congress by writing, under the pseudonym V. Bohush, that the dictatorship of the proletariat in Soviet Ukraine was putting power in the hands of a Russian and Jewish minority and preventing the Ukrainian majority from defending its economic and cultural interests (“Zahal’ne ekonomichne polozhennia” 425).²

At the congress, Kushnir read a paper entitled “National and Proletarian Revolution,” which he published in *Rozbudova* under the pseudonym B. Dniprians’kyi. Kushnir made passing references to “Polish-Jewish-Russian capitalists and landowners” as enemies of the liberation cause. In western Ukraine Poles and Jews held power in their hands. In Soviet Ukraine Russians and Jews had taken over the government and the economy, and the masses considered the government to be alien (Martynets’, “Spys referativ” 62; Muravs’kyi, *Kongres* 11; Dniprians’kyi 10, 12, 14).

Using the pseudonym V. Bohush, in the next issue of *Rozbudova*, Kushnir argued that although Russians and Jews constituted only 15% of the Soviet Ukrainian population, by virtue of the fact that they made up almost 50% of the urban population and had a higher

rate of literacy than Ukrainians, they dominated the Ukrainian peasants and workers, who constituted 80% of the population. Kushnir voiced no opinions about a nationalist policy regarding Jews, and perhaps the most ominous thing about his article was the title – which may not have been his – “Russian-Jewish Domination and the Role of Russian Culture in Soviet Ukraine” (“Rosiis’ko-zhydivs’ke panuvannia” 85–93).

*

More influential figures also blurred the differences between Jews and Russians. Dmytro Dontsov never belonged to the UVO or the OUN, but many nationalists called him their spiritual father. Born in Melitopol’, Dontsov studied in Saint Petersburg, joined the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party, and worked in Kyiv during the revolution. He thought then that the class struggle was more important than the national question. “In the struggle of Ukrainian society for national liberation,” he wrote, “the Ukrainian proletariat will advance not under the blue-and-yellow banner . . . but under the red flag of revolutionary social democracy” (Levyys’kyi 17).

When Dontsov settled in L’viv in 1922 and began working as a writer and editor, he took to railing against “the poisonous fumes of the rotten socialist-liberal world” and praising Benito Mussolini for being the first to inflict a blow to that world. Democracy, humanism, and socialism, he now said, had all been compromised. The only answer was a sharp turn to the right (Dm. Dontsov, foreword to Ostroverkha, *Musolini* 3).

“Oh, how widespread is the cult of Mussolini, Hitler, and other fascist strongmen among Ukrainian students! How many little Mussolinis and Hitlers have sprung up under the influence of Dontsov’s writings!” a Social Democratic journalist and political leader complained (Levyys’kyi 28).

The journalist Bohdan Osadchuk, who had grown up in Galicia in the 1930s, remarked that Dontsov, who came from a Ukrainianized Russian family, retained much of the Russian mentality. “This showed itself primarily in the peremptory nature of his judgments, intolerance, and the creation of new utopias. He was both an erudite and a demagogue. In appearance he looked like a cross between Rasputin and a Tatar khan. For primitive and unemployed young Ukrainians from the remote corners of the Galicia province he was something extraordinary, a Ukrainian Lenin *à rebours*” (Osadchuk).

The Lenin *à rebours* was also a rabid anti-Semite. He revealed something of the nature of his prejudices in a letter to the poet Ievhen Malaniuk in 1931. A literary scholar had accused Dontsov of being under Russian influence. “How does he know about my influences?” Dontsov asked.

I was born in Tavia, where I spent the first seventeen years of my life, a land that can be called our America, an ethnic mixture of Ukrainians, Poles, Jews, Bulgarians, Germans, Greeks, Turks, and Russians. Whence Russian influences? The only Russian influences could have come from Jewish classmates at the modern school. I belonged for a brief time to a self-education study circle, but soon left it because one of my female classmates had a hideous hooked nose and another classmate always smelled of onions. (Svarnyk 154–55)

The literature on Dontsov overlooks his aversion to Jews. The longest and most detailed study of his thought—by Mykhailo Sosnovs’kyi—makes no mention of his antipathies. Alexander Motyl discusses two articles in which Dontsov showed his malice and then dismisses the question with the remark that Dontsov did not see Ukrainian problems “in exclusively Jewish terms” (Motyl 73).

Taras Kurylo and John-Paul Himka provide a salutary corrective. In the early 1930s, they observe, Dontsov took a position of “radical anti-Semitism”:

Anti-Jewish themes began to appear in almost all his articles. . . In the late 1930s, in addition to popularizing Nazism, Dontsov also began propagating Hitlerite methods of “resolving the Jewish question.” By that time Dontsov had formulated a Ukrainian version of fascism. His views had great influence on OUN activists and on the nationalist movement in general. (Kurylo and Khymka, “Iak OUN?”: 264)³

In 1910 Dontsov had attacked the writer and ethnographer Olena Pchilka for spreading “antisemitic and religious fog” and “nationalist demagoguery” (Levyns’kyi 35). After the trial of Petliura’s assassin he began to do the same. Petliura’s mistake, Dontsov wrote, was that he “wanted to win the support of a cowardly and slavish race with concessions.”

This murder is an act of revenge by an agent of Russian imperialism against a person who became a symbol of the national struggle against Russian oppression. It does not matter that in this case a Jew became an agent of Russian imperialism. We have to and we will fight against the aspiration of Jewry to play the inappropriate role of lords in Ukraine . . . No other government took as many Jews into its service as did the Bolsheviks, and one might expect that like Pilate the Russians will wash their hands and say to the oppressed nations, “The Jew is guilty of everything.”

Jews are guilty, terribly guilty, because they helped consolidate Russian rule in Ukraine, but “the Jew is not guilty of everything.” Russian imperialism is guilty of everything.

Only when Russia falls in Ukraine will we be able to settle the Jewish question in our country in a way that suits the interest of the Ukrainian people. (D.D. 327)

In April 1933, responding to the wave of anti-Jewish actions in Germany after Hitler’s accession to power, Dontsov rejected the assimilation that some Ukrainian journalists were proposing as a solution to “the Jewish question.” “This is a dangerous game,” he exclaimed. Even if Jews adopted Ukrainian as their language, they would degrade “the supreme values by which the people lives and without which it perishes.”

We do not need to adopt Hitler’s methods. But we must remember that a people cannot allow itself to be ruled (politically or spiritually) by an alien element and that this alien element dare not, as is now the case in [Soviet] Ukraine, be the master of our land. It can only be a guest and must behave as a guest. (Snovyda)

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The thinking of the main theoretician of the OUN also underwent changes. Mykola Stsibors’kyi had served as a lieutenant in a Russian life-grenadier regiment during the Great War. Poisoned by gas and twice wounded, he was awarded several medals. In 1917 he joined a cavalry unit in the army of Symon Petliura, and when the army retreated west in 1920 he was interned in Poland for three years. In 1924 he escaped to Czechoslovakia and, although he had not completed *gymnasium*, managed to enroll at the Ukrainian Husbandry Academy in Poděbrady just outside Prague. In April 1929 Stsibors’kyi received a degree as an “engineer-economist.” His degree thesis was on the “Agrarian Policy of Ukrainian Nationalism.” His advisor, a certain Oleksander Mytsiuk, noted in his evaluation that Stsibors’kyi had written the thesis “in the spirit of Mussolinism.” He also remarked on Stsibors’kyi’s “imperialistic dream”: the need for a “powerful expansion of a colonial nature to the Near East” (Koval’).

Drawn into student politics, Stsibors’kyi founded the League of Ukrainian Nationalists in 1925. When the Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists was established, Stsibors’kyi set up a press and propaganda office (Kvitkovs’kyi 372), and when the League joined in creating the OUN, he served as chairman at the founding congress and was elected second in command to Ievhen Konoval’s (Muravs’kyi, *Kongres* 137, 313). He was also a prolific, though often long-winded and tedious, writer on ideology. He was thus as responsible as any other member of the OUN for shaping its pronouncements on Jews.

In his first published article on the subject, "Ukrainian Nationalism and Jewry," Stsibors'kyi recognized that Ukrainians were overwhelmingly hostile toward Jews. He insisted that the pogroms of 1919 had been a "profound mistake," pointed to the anti-Jewish teachings of the church, and argued that the disenfranchisement of the Jews determined the social role that they played. The causes of "the Jewish tendency to remain apart from the environment do not lie only in Jews," he wrote. "The environment in which Jewry finds itself bears much of the responsibility for the social and spiritual gulf that we see today." The Ukrainian movement, he concluded, had to show that it saw:

no basis for or advantages to restricting the legal status of Jewry in Ukraine. On the contrary, the government's task will be to grant Jews equal status and an opportunity to appear in every sphere of social, cultural, and other activity. This will help to overcome the present Jewish isolation more quickly. As for the fear that equality for Jews may harm the state, it must be kept in mind that Jews are not the kind of national minority in Ukraine that could have *subjective* reasons for being hostile in principle to our independence. On the contrary, favorable conditions for existence and involvement in the maelstrom of state and social life – all this will help to create in the Jewish masses a feeling not only of loyalty but also at a later time of conscious *patriotism* . . .

Thus the state, Stsibors'kyi argued, would have to create conditions in which Jewry, "while maintaining its organic racial, cultural, and religious features, will at the same time be drawn as an equal contributor into the circle of general social interests and positive creativity" ("Ukraïns'kyi natsionalizm" 272–73).

Yet, even as *Rozbudova* gave Stsibors'kyi a platform, it also made room for a column entitled "Heretical Thoughts." The author, identified as "Dr. Myron B.," often gave vent to reflections about the Jewish drive for world power. "Neither capitalism nor socialism," he dogmatized, "pose any danger for Jews. On the contrary, in their hands these forces take on a tremendous power and significance as the best ways of ruling the world by creating a grey mass that is capable of being no more than dung. . . . What a pity that we pay so little attention to those who have lived beside us since time immemorial and who hate us, suck us dry, and corrupt us" (B., Myron 206–207).

Early in 1931 the OUN underground in Galicia, as distinct from the Leadership, which worked from outside Poland, issued a pamphlet entitled "How and For What We Are Fighting the Poles." Intended to be a response to Polish policies in western Ukraine, the pamphlet resorted to old stereotypes of Jews. Poland had deprived the Ukrainian church of all its rights and handed the churches themselves over to Jewish lessees. The Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising of 1648 had punished the landowners and their lessees for the injustices they had committed. The pamphlet ended by calling for vengeance and violence:

We must respond to every act of Polish oppression with a similar reprisal. When they dissolve one of our societies, let us smash a Polish society. When the police break up a meeting, let us protest against the lack of rights with actions . . . Let us refuse to sell milk and eggs to Polish teachers. Let us smash the windows of taverns, break up the vodka bottles, and drive the Jews from the village. (Posivnych, "Vydannia" 7–14)⁴

Opinions within the OUN on "the Jewish question" were moving away from the position that Stsibors'kyi had taken. Oleksander Mytsiuk began his public life as a socialist revolutionary and was never a member of the UVO or the OUN, but by the late 1920s his views had become similar enough for him to publish in *Rozbudova* a favorable article on fascism. In 1931 *Rozbudova* began publishing a series of articles by Mytsiuk that came out as a book in 1933.

Mytsiuk's thesis was that the "parasitic activities" of the Jews had not changed over the centuries and were the result of their materialistic spirit. Kurylo and Himka call the book

“one of the most serious anti-Jewish publications engendered by the Ukrainian intellectual tradition.” The fact that *Rozbudova* ran the articles in almost every issue for three years, they say, suggests that an anti-Jewish policy had become programmatic for the OUN (Kurylo and Khymka 256, 257).⁵

Not everyone in the OUN agreed with the tenor of Mytsiuk’s articles. Stsibors’kyi, in particular, wrote to Konovalets’ to object to them and threatened Martynets’, the editor of *Rozbudova*, with a “revolution.” Konovalets’ replied that Stsibors’kyi’s observations were “correct” and that he had reprimanded Martynets’ for publishing Mytsiuk (Onats’kyi, *U vichnomu misti* 564).

Ten years later, in response to requests from the German authorities to publish attacks on Jews, the editor of *Krakovs’ki visti*, a Ukrainian newspaper published under German auspices in Cracow, invited Mytsiuk to write about “the negative role of Jews in Ukraine, particularly in economic life.” The lengthy article that Mytsiuk submitted recapitulated what he had written in his book. The ideal world for Jews, he opined, was one without states or borders in which they could pursue their business interests without restriction. Hence the doctrines of Marx – a Jew, of course – were a reflection of the psychology of the people. “The mass participation of the Jews, both rich and poor, in the centralized international socialist and communist movement,” Mytsiuk pontificated, “is only a spontaneous manifestation of their psychology.” Then he leveled a charge that resonates even today. Jews had taken up the leading positions in the USSR and were exploiting working people. “When God gave crop failure in 1933, Jews gave the people famine: millions died, but not a single Jew starved to death” (Mytsiuk, “Zhydy v Ukraïni,” no. 125).

Mytsiuk also wrote at length about how Jews had exploited peasants. As far back as 1938 – he said this in the summer of 1943 – he had heard peasants in Transcarpathia voicing the pious wish that Hitler would come to them, if only for a month, to help them with their Jews (Mytsiuk, “Zhydy v Ukraïni,” no. 176).

In 1933, as Mytsiuk’s articles were appearing in *Rozbudova*, the OUN sent Ievhen Liakhovych as its representative to Great Britain. Liakhovych was a journalist who had been promoting the UVO and OUN in the United States, and his job in London would be to lobby for the Ukrainian cause. On his arrival, Liakhovych called on Laurence Collier, the foremost expert on Russian affairs at the Foreign Office, and R.W. Seton-Watson, the historian and champion of the subject peoples of Europe at the School of Slavonic Studies. Then Liakhovych paid a visit to the headquarters of Sir Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists. He wrote up the meeting in a letter to Ievhen Onats’kyi.

Liakhovych had hoped to see Sir Oswald himself, but it was the chief of the propaganda department and his deputy who received him. They sat up when he told them that he was representing Ukrainian nationalists who had much in common with the fascists. The two men knew little about Ukraine – it was fighting the Bolsheviks; it lay between Europe and Asia; and a lot of Jews lived there. The nationalists would have a good bit of trouble with them, the propaganda chief observed.

Liakhovych demurred. His people were not anti-Semites. “Anti-Semitism is an irrational and unjustifiable hatred,” he explained. “We are combating the Jews because they have always done us harm.”

Yes, said the chief. The situation in England was the same (Onats’kyi 105).

Having reported on his talk with Mosley’s Blackshirts, Liakhovych turned, in his letter to Onats’kyi, to Mykola Stsibors’kyi. Many of the observations in his memoranda were apt, Liakhovych thought, but why did Stsibors’kyi evince such a profound hatred for fascism? Hitlerism and fascism were a natural force that was capturing the whole

world. “And we” – Liakhovych was using the first-person plural to encompass the entire OUN – “are the current that suits that force.” Yes, he admitted, Ukrainian nationalists could not ape others. They were working under different circumstances, and they faced different tasks. “But in principle,” he opined, “we must not renounce this force” (Onats’kyi 105–6).

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Iurii Mylianych – there appears to be no biographical information about him, and the man behind the pseudonym may have been Volodymyr Martynets’ – also had a go at the “Jewish question” in *Rozbudova*.⁶ He began his article by observing that there was no need to list all the injuries that Jews had caused Ukrainians. In the struggle with Poland they sided with the Poles; in the struggle with Bolshevism they supported the Bolsheviks. They lived off the Ukrainian population, but gave it nothing in return. “In addition to a number of external enemies Ukraine also has an internal enemy – Jewry... Jewry and its negative consequences for our liberation cause can be liquidated only by an organized collective effort.”

The Zionist solution, the gradual removal of all Jews to their own country, Mylianych went on, would be the best solution, but British and Arab opposition ruled it out. “In the struggle with Jewry, which is hostile to us in every respect,” he concluded, “we must develop our own system and the most suitable forms for a solution to the Jewish question. The problem is difficult. . . But it *must* be solved” (“Zhydy” 271, 276).

Volodymyr Martynets’ was ambitious, arrogant, and argumentative – one of the names he had assumed in the underground was *Sokyrka*, or “Hatchet” – and he had edited *Surma* and *Rozbudova natsii* in the late 1920s and early 1930s (Anatolii Kentii and Volodymyr Lozyts’kyi, introduction to Konovalets’ and Martynets’, *Ia b”iu v dzvin* 18; Halaiko, “Chasopys ‘Surma’” 114). In 1938 Martynets’ published an article, “The Jewish Problem in Ukraine.” The OUN thought the article important enough to circulate as a reprint.

Martynets’ began the piece with a quotation from Werner Sombart, the German economist and sociologist, that tells us much about what is to come. Sombart thought that a *Volksggeist*, or metaphysical spirit, accompanied German socialism. Its antithesis was the Jewish spirit. This was not a matter of being born Jewish or of believing in Judaism, but of a capitalistic spirit. The task for the German people and National Socialism was to destroy that spirit.

Following in Sombart’s footsteps, Martynets’ made the premise of his article the assumption that there was a “Jewish problem.” Jews, he said, were parasites, a plague. What’s more, they had declared themselves enemies of everything Ukrainian. Britain had restricted Jewish immigration, and Italy and Germany had passed anti-Jewish legislation. In Ukraine the problem was more difficult: Italy had 44,000 Jews, Germany 600,000. The Ukrainian lands, by contrast, had 3,226,000, or almost a fifth of all the Jews in the world. “Our Jews,” Martynets’ declared,

are from a political perspective a hostile element, from a socio-economic perspective parasitic, from a cultural and national perspective harmful, from a moral and ideological perspective corruptive . . . and from a racial perspective unsuitable for mixing and assimilation. (“Zhydivs’ka problema” 33; *Zhydivs’ka problema* 10)

The question, then, was how to eliminate Jews. Martynets’ considered five methods: assimilation, “racial-national isolation,” agrarianization or settling on the land, expulsion, and “complete isolation.”

Assimilation was both undesirable and impossible to attain. When races mix, the psychological features of the older one prevail over those of the younger one. Jews,

who were committed racists, constituted the older and purer race. They were also wanderers and lacked a “state instinct.” If Jews mixed with Ukrainians, they would weaken their “state instinct” and contribute to the rise of “internationalism.”

“Racial-national isolation” – banning mixed marriages, for example – would allow Jews to retain all the benefits that they had acquired as parasites on the Ukrainian body and to continue to hold power as a privileged people.

Agrarianization would also not work. The Polish, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Soviet governments had tried – and failed – to turn Jews into farmers in order to end their parasitic existence and to speed up their assimilation. Ukrainians tilled the soil with their hands and their backs. As eternal wanderers, Jews were interested only in buying and selling it. Even in Palestine, they worked the soil with Arab labor. In Ukraine their agricultural settlements were a rape of the maternal land.

The expulsion of the Jews was out of the question simply because of the sheer numbers – three and a quarter million people.

Only the complete isolation of the Jews, Martynets’ concluded, could solve the Jewish problem. Jews had an intermediary economic function. Whenever this function was restricted, the welfare of the gentile population rose, and the welfare and natural rate of increase of the Jews fell. “To reduce the number of Jews,” Martynets’ announced, “neither pogroms nor forcible resettlement will be necessary. It will suffice to separate completely from them” (“Zhydivs’ka problema” 45; *Zhydivs’ka problema* 22).

For all the scientificity of his arguments – an epigraph from a prominent social scientist, political-economic jargon, and a plethora of quotations and statistics – Martynets’ did not put forth a rational argument.⁷ He never explained, for example, what he meant by “complete isolation” or how it might be implemented. The psychological engine behind his logic was envy. Ukrainians were weak; Jews were powerful. Ukrainians were tied to the land; Jews roamed the world. Ukrainians submitted to assimilation and racial mixing; Jews put up resistance. Martynets’ was living in an idealized pre-capitalist rural community in which the dwellers were honest tillers of the soil and the only representatives of the alien outside world were the Jews who enforced the will of the distant landowner.

Anti-Jewish sentiment in the OUN also swirled out in poetry. A bit of doggerel published on the first anniversary of the assassination of Ievhen Konovalets’ – a Soviet agent had handed him a box of chocolates packed with explosives in Rotterdam in May 1938 – had a telling title, “To Vengeance, to Arms, to Revenge!”

Know, you Russian-Jewish reptiles,
Who for centuries have sucked our blood,
That a hellish wrath swirls in our souls,
That we will have to meet with you.

(qtd. in Golczewski, “Shades of Grey” 125)

The Tyrrhenian coastline, summer 1933: “how much those Jewish brats have cost us!”

The Second Great Congress of the OUN, held in Rome in August 1939, elected Andrii Mel’nyk to take the place of Konovalets’ as head of the OUN. A man of “silky steel,” a poet said (Malaniuk 72). The OUN bestowed on him the title “Vozhd’.” The congress also approved a political program which said that the Ukrainian state would treat national minorities “according to their attitude toward the liberation struggle of Ukraine and its

statehood” (“Pol. prohrama i ustrii O.U.N,” MG 30 C167/vol. 147/file 40, p. 12, LAC; Orhanizatsiia ukrains’kykh natsionalistiv, *Politychna Prohrama* 30).

A few days after Germany started the World War II by invading Poland, the new leader of the OUN met with German intelligence chief Wilhelm Canaris in Vienna. Canaris congratulated Mel’nyk on “the successful resolution of the question of western Ukraine.” It would now become independent, and Canaris wanted to see a constitution for the new state and a list of government officials (Knysh, *Pered pokhodom* 100).

The job of drafting the constitution went to Mykola Stsibors’kyi. He was the OUN’s organizational officer, and he had written the programs for the congresses in 1929 and 1939. In 1930 he had condemned pogroms and had hoped to convince Jews that a Ukrainian state would pose no danger to them. Now he wrote about an “authoritarian and totalitarian state” whose *vozhd’* – like the Spanish *caudillo*, the Italian *duce*, and the German *Führer*, the word means “leader” – would be elected for life and would be accountable to “God, the nation, and his conscience.” In Articles 3 and 4 of a section on “the duties and rights of citizens” Stsibors’kyi dealt with citizenship. Article 4 defined those who would obtain citizenship when the Ukrainian state was declared:

- 1 All persons of Ukrainian nationality who reside within the borders of the Ukrainian State.
- 2 Persons of other nationalities whose parents or who themselves resided permanently within the borders of the Ukrainian State after 1 August 1914.

Note: Persons mentioned in point 2 of this article may be denied Ukrainian citizenship. Persons of Jewish nationality constitute an exception to Articles 3 and 4 and are subject to a separate law. (“Narys proiektu osnovnykh zakoniv (Konstytutsiï) Ukraïns’koï Derzhavy,” 3833/1/7/8, TsDAVOVU)⁸

Despite the ambiguity in the article – who exactly was a Ukrainian, who a Jew? – and the singular treatment of Jews – the article mentioned only them – Andrii Mel’nyk was pleased with the opus. When the OUN had to draft a constitution, he wrote in a memoir, “Stsibors’kyi rose to the task. He asked to be relieved of his daily responsibilities. . . and in the course of three days and nights prepared a draft, which proved to be no worse than any until now, although its author was not a lawyer [and] did not have a staff.” Mel’nyk ended by commending Stsibors’kyi for his experience, knowledge, and “exceptional services” to the OUN (Mel’nyk 41–42).⁹

Mel’nyk’s branch of the OUN – by now the organization was splitting into rival factions – set up in late 1939 or early 1940 a “state planning commission” to deliberate on all the other legislation that the new state would need. In addition to Stsibors’kyi’s constitution, the commission examined a land reform program. It proposed to give “the Ukrainian nation the right to confiscate land from all foreigners (even if they have lived in our land for five hundred years).” The nation would also confiscate land from Ukrainians who remained neutral during the coming uprising or who helped alien oppressors. On the other hand, aliens who fought with arms for Ukrainian statehood or who had otherwise distinguished themselves in the service of the state would be granted the same right to own land as Ukrainians (Kucheruk and Cherchenko, eds., *Dokumenty* 87).

The commission also received a draft bill on education. Written by the literary historian and scholar Leonyd Bilets’kyi, the long and detailed draft – it considered everything from kindergartens to the powers of university deans and rectors – began with encomiums to the Ukrainian people and its “extremely rich heroic past and struggle for liberation.” But “Communist internationalism, the Jewish spirit of corruption, and a class-limited sphere of thinking” had tried to eradicate the most intimate experiences of the Ukrainian soul.

The class hatred that “Jewish and Russian Bolshevik propaganda” had sown was undermining society and corrupting morals. And “Jewish Communist poison” was breaking down family values and causing children to rise against their parents. Overcoming these evils, Bilets’kyi wrote, would be the task of the “authoritarian and totalitarian Ukrainian State” (Kucheruk and Cherchenko, eds., *Dokumenty* 121, 122, 126).

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In February 1938, Arno Schickedanz, a top official of the Nazi party’s Foreign Policy Office and a close associate of Alfred Rosenberg, the future Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, urged the party to stop supporting the OUN. He had detected “anti-German attitudes” among the nationalists. The reason for the attitudes? Three advisors to Ievhen Konovalets’ were married to Jewish women (Kosyk, *Ukraina pid chas Druhoi svitovoi viiny* 534).

The marital arrangements of Mykola Kapustians’kyi, a senior officer of the Ukrainian army in 1917–1920 and a member of the OUN from its founding until his death in 1969, seem not to have left a mark on the nationalist movement. But allegations about the wives of Mykola Stsibors’kyi and Richard Jary, and about the origins of Jary himself, festered within the OUN for 10 years until, having suppurated in 1940, they spread a poison that both weakened its unity and gave evidence of its hostility toward Jews.

Nationalists had been talking for years about the pedigree of Richard Jary, journalist, military leader, and founding member of the OUN. His father was a Czech and his mother a Polish Jew, some said. His wife made matters worse. Although she spoke good Ukrainian and wore a cross on a chain around her neck, she had been born an Orthodox Jew (Serhiichuk, *Stepan Bandera* 520; Vedienieiev, “Zahadka” 149, 150; Kucheruk, *Riko Iaryi* 31–33; Patryliak, *Viis’kova diial’nist’* 261–62). And as the financial officer of the OUN Leadership and liaison between it and the Abwehr, Jary had pocketed some of the money that the Germans were contributing and had bought himself a luxurious villa near Berlin (“Vypiska iz spravki o prestupnykh svyaziakh ukrainskikh natsionalistov s razvedyvatel’nymi organami burzhuaznykh gosudarstv i podryvnoi deiatel’nosti protiv Sovetskogo Soiuza,” 57/4/340/8, TsDAHOU).

One ranking member of the OUN who felt an antipathy toward Richard and Roza Jary was Volodymyr Martynets’. Although Jary declared that he was a Ukrainian and was displeased when someone called him a German, Martynets’ would recall, “I could never regard him as a Ukrainian.” The reason was not just his poor proficiency in the language. “He was in addition married to a Jewish convert” (*Ukrains’ke pidpillia* 188).

Mykola Stsibors’kyi’s private life also caused concern within the OUN. He had been married once or twice and then had established – or perhaps reestablished – relations with a woman whom he had known in Zhytomyr before 1917 and who had three daughters from a previous marriage. Konovalets’ expressed his fears about Stsibors’kyi in December 1932. “I have information that he is increasingly coming under the influence of his future wife,” he wrote to Dmytro Andriievs’kyi. “The matter must be immediately examined. If you go to Paris, please take a closer look to determine whether this information is correct” (Cherchenko 335).

In 1934 Stsibors’kyi wrote several letters to Konovalets’ to complain that two members of the Leadership had objected to his marriage earlier that year (Zaitsev). In replying to Stsibors’kyi on 17 April 1934, Konovalets’ couched his answer in leader-like language:

If nationalism is waging war against mixed marriages insofar as conquerors (especially Poles and Russians) are concerned, then it cannot bypass the problem of mixed marriages with Jews,

who are indisputably if not greater, then at least comparable, foes of our rebirth. If we require that rank-and-file members observe the principles that we have proclaimed, then we cannot thereby make exceptions for ourselves . . .

Your action has greatly encumbered the organization. (3833/3/1/83, TsDAVOVU)

The pressure took effect. In 1933, when he wrote a pamphlet to argue that Ukrainian peasants could obtain land only by mounting a national revolution under the leadership of the OUN, Stsibors'kyi had slipped in two references to Jews. In describing the conditions of the peasants in Soviet Ukraine, he wrote that the Communist party found its mainstay in "the dregs of the Russian and Jewish urban scum." And when he turned his attention to Eastern Galicia and Volhynia, he observed that at a time when many peasants suffered from overcrowding and land shortage Polish landowners and Jewish lessees employed peasants as hirelings and stable boys for beggarly wages (*O.U.N. i selianstvo* 6, 11).

In 1938, after Konovalets' had upbraided him, Stsibors'kyi declared that the future Ukrainian state would have to face "the burning issue of unloading alien national elements (almost all of them hostile to us) from the urban and industrial centers." The measures to achieve this, he wrote, would need to be "as resolute as possible (as also in the case of liquidating alien colonization of the land) because until our centers are thoroughly cleansed the internal order in the country will be constantly threatened" (Stsibors'kyi, "Problemy hospodars'koï vlasnosti" 14).

When Stsibors'kyi returned to the agrarian question in 1939, he hinted at a policy of ethnic cleansing. After talking about colonization in both Soviet Ukraine and Galicia and Volhynia, he added that the nationalist view of this colonization was one of "uncompromising determination." The "foreign parasitic growth" on the national body would have to be torn off. A "large part of the Russian, Polish, and other immigrants" would be killed in the first stages of the revolution." The rest would be removed by "legislative and administrative measures." In concluding peace treaties with the former occupying powers the nationalist government would demand that the colonists be repatriated.

If these demands are not accepted, the authorities will carry out repatriation without the consent of the powers in question. We can expect that such liquidation of alien colonization will evoke shrieks about "humanism," "justice," and so forth. The state authorities will not take this hypocritical demagoguery into consideration, just as the present occupiers do not take into consideration the shrieks and the victims in the plundered Ukrainian countryside. Chips will fly when forests are cut down! (*Zemel'ne pytannia* 85)

Stsibors'kyi then made a gracious exception for colonists

descended from nationalities that are hostile to Ukraine who have lived on our land since ancient times, and especially for colonists who do not belong to hostile nationalities (Bulgarian, Greek, and other colonists, for example) who have lived for a long time in some regions of Ukraine and have made significant contributions to the development of their agriculture. These categories of colonists will be subject to the general provisions of agrarian legislation. (*Zemel'ne pytannia* 85–86)

Stepan Bandera, who had been serving a life sentence in a Polish prison and who had gained his freedom when Poland fell to the German onslaught in September 1939, refused to accept Andrii Mel'nyk as the Leader of the OUN, and in February 1940 set up a "revolutionary leadership." The two factions retained the same name, argued about which one was legitimate, exchanged insults, and when the German-Soviet war began, set about killing each other off. But their rhetoric regarding Jews was similar.

On 10 August 1940, Bandera wrote a letter to Mel'nyk. It was long, deferential, in places even eloquent. Bandera said that he wanted to come to terms with Mel'nyk; he

wanted him to remain at the head of the organization. But he insisted that Mel'nyk remove the traitors in the Leadership. One of them was Mykola Stsibors'kyi, who had shown "an absence of personal morals in family life that is inadmissible in a nationalist."

My face burned when I read during the pretrial investigation in Warsaw the late Leader's letters regarding these scandals and how [he] condemned [Stsibors'kyi's] actions. There are principles of morality and ethics in family life... fundamentals of nationalist morality.

Where is the man's personal honor? How can he, while counting himself as a theoretician of Ukrainian nationalism, constantly live in violation of nationalist principles and at the same time sign nationalist publications with his own name and offer himself for a leading position? If he is too weak to take himself in hand, then shouldn't he hide his face from nationalists?

And you are keeping him in the Leadership! He is to take part in making the Organization's most important decisions... What sort of morality is this? How can you tolerate this? No! This will never be! As long as I am alive I will not permit Stsibors'kyi to lead those saintly OUN members who are laying down their lives and whose families are enduring the worst possible agony... ("Lyst Stepana Bandery do polk. Andriia Mel'nyka," MG 30-C467/vol. 147, file 30, pp. 24, LAC; Kosyk, *Rozkol* 94).

Then Bandera pinned down the reason for his outrage. Stsibors'kyi had married a Jewish woman, a "suspicious" Russian Jewish woman at that. Konovalets' had demanded that Stsibors'kyi break off with her. He had refused. He was therefore a Bolshevik agent, a traitor to the cause ("Lyst Stepana Bandery do polk. Andriia Mel'nyka," MG 30-C167/vol. 147, file 30, p. 24, LAC; Kosyk, *Rozkol* 95).¹⁰

In late 1940 the Mel'nyk faction issued its reply to Bandera's letter: a white book on the "Jary-Bandera diversion-rebellion" (*Bila knyha OUN: Pro dyversiiu-bunt Iary-Bandera*, PR1985.0191/64/1, PAA; BOO). The author of the unsigned and undated publication was Mykola Stsibors'kyi ("Propozytsii vnutrishn'o-orhanizatsiinoi komisii" 676).¹¹ His paper was a recitation of who had said, or written, what to whom and when. His evidence against the rebels was thin. Jary had pocketed OUN funds. Bandera had sent OUN men across the German-Soviet border to a certain death. The charges that the diversionaries had leveled against the loyalists were groundless. The opposition to Mel'nyk was nothing more than a destructive clique. Bandera was a puppet in the hands of Jary, who had been scheming against the Leadership for more than 10 years (*Bila knyha* 88, 93). As for Stsibors'kyi himself, the accusation that he was a Soviet agent was baseless, the remarks about his private life "hideous slander" (*Bila knyha* 84).

Stsibors'kyi's white book was turgid and tedious, but it avoided ad hominem attacks and jibes against Jews. Iaroslav Stets'ko, who had thrown in his fortunes with the Bandera faction, wrote a rebuttal that was longer and even more laborious (*Chomu bula potribna chystka v O.U.N.*, PR1985.0191/64/2-4, PAA).¹² The Mel'nyk faction had called Jary a "Mongolian Jewish crossbreed." In defending Jary, Stets'ko ignored the charge that he had misappropriated OUN funds and focused on the accusations that he was not a Ukrainian and had plotted against Konovalets': "Jary... regards himself as a Ukrainian and took part in our liberation struggle as the commanding officer of a cavalry regiment or brigade. He joined the UVO in its beginnings and was one of the late Leader's closest associates" (*Chomu bula potribna chystka v O.U.N.* 2:47, PR1985.0191/64/3, pp. 27, 60, PAA; Kosyk, *Rozkol* 108).

Although Stets'ko would later deny that he harbored any ill feelings against Jews, the complaints that he made about Stsibors'kyi's Jewish wife suggest otherwise:

Until the spring of 1940 you not only did not deny, but yourself admitted that your third living wife is Jewish. Not so long ago, at a bathing resort in Italy, you introduced your wife's three

daughters to several of our acquaintances, and Mr. Onats'kyi said in a fit of sincerity more or less as follows: "Oh! If only you knew how much those Jewish brats have cost us since 1928!" And then . . . you denied everything and declared that it was all a lie. . . .

Forgive us for interfering in your family affairs, but we are doing so in order to expose you as an unprincipled person who insinuates himself into eminent and responsible positions in organized Ukrainian life. Just as the late Leader expelled you from the Leadership, so now there is no room for you at the helm of national life (*Chomu bula potribna chystka v O.U.N.* 3:17, PR1985.0191/64/4, PAA; MG 30 C167/vol. 147, file 35, pp. 17–18, LAC).¹³

In July 1941 the OUN(M) was still slinging mud at Bandera's adherents. A "Black Book of Rebellion" that the Mel'nyk faction issued in response to Stets'ko's opus stated that Jary was "by origin a Czech-Jewish crossbreed (father Czech, mother Jewish), married to a Jewish woman." A few lines down the page the broadside repeated that Jary was "by nature a clever half-Czech, half-Jew." The Mel'nyk faction accused Jary of misappropriating OUN funds to buy two estates for himself, dismissed Bandera as Jary's tool, his "goy," one of the leaders "newly anointed by Rabbi Jary," and called both of them "Bolshevik tools." *Ukrayns'kyi robotnyk*, a newspaper that the OUN(B) was publishing in Germany, the faction also said, was furthering Jary and Bandera's "Marxist Jewish revolution." "What sort of a revolutionary is Jary when he and his Jewish wife are living on our money, the contributions they have extorted from us . . .?" ("Chorna knyha buntu: Iary—Bandera—Horbovyi," MG30-C167/147/34/pp. 6, 8, 9, 13, 14, 27, LAC; Kosyk, *Rozkol* 108).

Stsibors'kyi returned to the question of minorities one last time – he was assassinated on 30 August 1941 – in a screed about "internal imperialism." A liberal minorities policy, he wrote, could bring about "catastrophic consequences." The minorities had to be assimilated. The government would have to take "hard corrective measures" to bring about "the complete elimination of alien elements" from the social, economic, and cultural life of the country. If nationalists failed in that task, Ukraine would not be able to carry out "the historic mission that it is potentially capable of." That mission was nothing less than to establish a "Ukrainian Empire." Stsibors'kyi added the pregnant remark that he was setting aside the "problem of Jewry," which would require "a special plan and methods" ("Za vnutrishnii imperiializm" 419, 422, 430–31).

The OUN(M) kept up its attacks on the Bandera faction. It was convinced that Bandera's men had killed Stsibors'kyi, and in the autumn of 1941 it issued an appeal in which it claimed that it had become the victim of a "Bolshevik-Jewish-German provocation." "The German-Jewish *Mischling* Richard Jary and his Jewish wife" were making full use of the Germans' desire not to have the OUN as a strong ally on their side. Jary had brought about the split in the OUN, pocketed \$70,000 of the OUN's money, and used it to finance Bandera and Stets'ko and to buy estates for himself and his "Jewess" ("Natsionalisty!" M.52/412 YVA).¹⁴

Berlin, July 1941: "I support the destruction of the Jews and the expedience of bringing German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine"

Stepan Bandera's followers had concluded that the Second Great Congress of the OUN, which had taken place in Rome in August 1939 and had elected Andrii Mel'nyk as Leader, had contravened OUN statutes, and in April 1941 they held a second Second Great Congress in Cracow to take the place of the previous one. One of the resolutions that the Cracow congress passed dealt with Jews:

The Jews in the USSR constitute the most dedicated support for the ruling Bolshevik regime and the vanguard of Russian imperialism in Ukraine. The Russian Bolshevik government exploits the anti-Jewish sentiments of the Ukrainian masses in order to divert their attention from the real perpetrator of evil and in order to channel them in times of uprising into pogroms of Jews. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists combats Jews as supporters of the Russian Bolshevik regime and at the same time makes clear to the masses that the principal foe is Moscow.¹⁵

Students of the nationalists' attitudes toward Jews disagree on the significance of this pronouncement. Taras Hunczak insists that "neither the Ukrainian underground movement nor any other organizations... cultivated anti-Semitic programs or policies. They readily accepted Jews into their ranks and sheltered them from Nazi persecution, despite the popular perception of Jews as promoters of communism" (Hunczak 42). The *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* amplifies Hunczak's assurance. "There has never... been," says the article on anti-Semitism, "a Ukrainian anti-Semitic organization or political party" (Wytwycky 82).

Henry Abramson calls the resolution "surprisingly weak" and points out that the OUN(B) "defines its struggle with the Communists as paramount and attacks Jews exclusively in this context" (45). "One might conclude incorrectly," Aharon Weiss comments, "that Jews are defined as a secondary enemy... and that the primary enemy is represented by the Moscow regime. We must not surrender to illusions, however. The Moscow regime was somewhere far away, but 'żydy' [Jews] were there and quite accessible. That is why the statute of OUN Bandera played such an important role in the shaping of attitudes of part of the Ukrainian population towards the Jews during the Holocaust" (267).

Neither side has considered that the OUN(B) intended the resolution for public consumption. Roman Il'nyts'kyi, in writing about postwar debates within the OUN(B) regarding its program, argued that the organization talked about having two programs, one meant for members and supporters and one for outsiders. The first program would be the unchanging credo of the OUN. The second would be intended for external consumption and could vary according to circumstances (Krychevs'kyi 26–27).

When the Cracow congress closed, Stepan Bandera asked three of his closest companions – Stepan Lenkav's'kyi, Roman Shukhevych, and Iaroslav Stets'ko – to join him in preparing a master plan for the moment when Germany would attack the Soviet Union. Bandera had already recruited several of his confederates to draft a plan in December 1939, but much had changed since then. Entitled "The Struggle and Activities of the OUN in Wartime," the new version was long – 74 closely typed pages – and detailed. And it bristled with references to "aliens" in general and to Russians, Poles, and Jews in particular. OUN veterans have mentioned the plan in their memoirs; scholars have cited it in their studies; portions have appeared in print. Yet we have still not made use of the document in construing what the OUN(B) was thinking and doing in the summer of 1941.¹⁶

One section of the plan dealt with "insurrectionary units from the Red Army":

In disarming a unit immediately divide it by nationality. Take Ukrainians in, peoples subjugated by Moscow and friendly to us if they so desire as well. Better to set them (the subjugated peoples) up as separate units. Give them (our people and our friends) every possible assistance and care ...

With the rest of the disarmed soldiers do as follows: Russians peasants to be disarmed and handed over as prisoners to the Germans, that is, to be liquidated. Other nationalities to be permitted to go home. Political officers and known Communists and Russians to be liquidated. The same (somewhat sharper) with NKVD units. (3833/2/1/31, TsDAVOVU)

The “cleansing of hostile elements from the field” was a part of the plan: “At a time of chaos and confusion it is permissible to liquidate undesirable Polish, Russian, and Jewish activists, especially supporters of Bolshevik Russian imperialism” (3833/2/1/32, TsDAVOVU).

The plan also established a policy for the treatment of nationalities:

The national minorities are divided into a) those that are friendly to us, that is, members of previously subjugated peoples b) those that are hostile to us, Russians, Poles, Jews.

Re a. Have equal rights with Ukrainians; we help them return to their homelands.

Re b. Destruction in battle, particularly those who defend the regime: deportation to their lands, principally destroy the intelligentsia, which cannot be allowed to assume any official positions, and in general make it impossible to create an intelligentsia, that is, access to schools and so forth. For example, so-called Polish peasants are to be assimilated, given the explanation, especially at this heated and fanatical time, that they are Ukrainians of the Latin rite who have been forcibly assimilated. The leaders to be destroyed. Jews to be isolated, eliminated from official positions in order to avoid sabotage, Russians and Poles all the more so. If there should be an insurmountable need to leave a Jew in the economic administration, place one of our militiamen over him and liquidate him for the slightest offense. Administrators of various branches can only be Ukrainians, never hostile aliens.

Assimilation of Jews is excluded (3833/2/1/38, TsDAVOVU).

And the plan provided “general reminders”:

Our power must be terrible for its opponents. Terror for hostile aliens and our own traitors, creative freedom and the breath of new ideas from the Ukrainian who rules his own land must be sensed in every action and at every step. Involve in work all honest and patriotic Ukrainians, Ukrainian workers, by which we mean not only Ukrainian laborers, but all creative Ukrainians. No social class criteria, only national ones. (3833/2/1/39, TsDAVOVU)

The plan gave “security instructions”:

11. Collect personal data on all prominent Poles, members of underground organizations, who could try to organize an uprising at the appropriate time. Apply an offensive tactic to the extent that this is necessary and possible.
12. “Compile a “black list” of all fervent Communists, NKVD agents, secret informers, provocateurs, and other hirelings of the Communist regime. The “black list” should above all include leaders.
13. Compile a “black list” of all prominent Ukrainians who could try to conduct their own politics at the appropriate time, thus breaking up the unity of the Ukrainian people.
14. Compile a “black list” of Poles according to the instructions in 11. (3833/2/1/58, TsDAVOVU)

A “brief survey of the organization of the security service in the USSR” stressed that forces that had been the mainstay of NKVD and Soviet power in Ukraine had to be neutralized when the new order was being established. These forces were:

1. Russians who have been sent... to strengthen Moscow’s power in Ukraine.
2. Jews, both individually and as a national group.
3. Aliens, for the most part various Asians, whom Moscow is using to colonize Ukraine with the aim of creating a national checkerboard in Ukraine.
4. Poles in the western Ukrainian regions who have not renounced their dream of rebuilding a Greater Poland at the expense of Ukrainian lands, even if that Poland has to be red. (3833/2/1/60–61, TsDAVOVU)

The plan then set out operating procedures for the “people’s militia” in villages, collective and state farms, industrial enterprises, districts, and regions. The section on village militias specified that:

4. All weapons are to be deposited with the People's Militia command within twenty-four hours (set exact deadline).
5. All residents of the village (locality, collective farm, factory) who arrived here after 17 September 1939 have twenty-four hours to report to the People's Militia command. (For the six western Ukrainian oblasts in particular this announcement should state: anyone who arrived here from beyond the Zbruch after 17 September 1939; for the Chernivtsi and Akkerman oblasts: anyone who arrived there from eastern Ukraine after 1 June 1940.)
6. All Jews are to report immediately to the People's Militia command (set a deadline).
7. All citizens of the village (locality, collective farm, factory) are required to report to the People's Militia command and any concealed Red Army soldiers, NKVD agents, Jews, and secret informers, in short, anyone who does not belong the community and who came here as a result of the occupation of Ukrainian lands by Red Moscow, as well as citizens who were informers for the NKVD. . . .
10. Failure to carry out these instructions may be punished by application of revolutionary repressions, including the penalty of execution, particularly in the case of points 4 and 7. (3833/2/1/62, TsDAVOVU)

The section on militias in collective and state farms stipulated three categories of people who were excluded from membership in the collective:

1. All aliens who arrived at the collective to watch over the exploitation of the collectivized peasants.
2. Jews employed in the collective as overseers for the Bolshevik authorities.
3. All representatives of the Bolshevik authorities, secret informers, and others who belonged to the NKVD or NKGB, the procurator's office, reporters for Bolshevik newspapers, and the like. All non-members of the collective must be interned and kept under guard. (3833/2/1/66, TsDAVOVU)

In industrial enterprises the militia was to intern "elements that are unreliable or hostile to the nationalist revolution. In particular all Jews and NKVD and NKGB agents must be interned" (3833/2/1/66, TsDAVOVU).

The section on district militias specified that in addition to a secretariat, a quartermaster's department, an identity card office, an investigations department, and a prison, the militia would establish an "internment camp" for "Jews, asocial elements, and prisoners of war." The commandant would compile lists of NKVD agents and persons who had shown particular zeal in persecuting Ukrainians. "This means above all non-Ukrainians, hence Jews, Russians, and Poles." In cities the militia would operate both prisons and internment camps. It would organize "regular life" only after establishing order and "conducting a purge of NKVD agents, Russians, Jews, and others" (3833/2/1/69, 70, 72, TsDAVOVU).

Where the regional militia was concerned, the OUN(B) plan stressed that in the first stage of establishing a state the militia was the only permissible executive organ and that it was to "crush in embryo any attempts by the alien element in Ukraine to organize itself. This is a time of national revolution, and there cannot be any toleration for the former conqueror. White guards can be particularly dangerous. The Ukrainian State will later regulate treatment of national minorities by legislative means" (3833/2/1/73, TsDAVOVU).

Anti-Jewish topoi also appeared in a section on slogans that OUN(B) activists could use to drum up support for the national revolution. Many were variations on the

żydokomuna theme: “Stalinist and Jewish commissars are the arch-enemies of the people!” “Workers in western Europe are afraid of the Jewish and Russian commune. They see all the lies and fraud. They know that Marxism is a Jewish invention” (3833/2/1/77, TsDAVOVU).

OUN(B) activists were to encourage Red Army soldiers to kill “Russians, Jews, NKVD agents, commissars, and everyone who wants war and death for us. They are the greatest enemies of the people.” The activists were to tell workers to defend their workplaces: “Don’t allow the Red Army to destroy your factories while it is retreating. Kill the enemies among you – Jews and secret informers. Make your factories into bastions of the liberation revolution” (3833/2/1/80, TsDAVOVU).¹⁷

A broadsheet addressed to Ukrainian nationalists and released within a few days of the start of the German invasion declared that the struggle was being crowned with victory and the day of reckoning had come. “Ukrainian nationalism,” said the broadsheet,

is leading the struggle for a Ukraine for Ukrainians, against Russians and other foreigners, for the political organization of the masses under the leadership of Ukrainian nationalism, against the materialistic Russian and Jewish world view, against class struggle and internal discord . . . for the militarization of the entire Ukrainian people, for a strong Ukrainian army, against the deception of the masses by Russian and internationalist lies. (“Ukraïns’ki natsionalisty i natsionalisty!,” 3833/1/12/33, TsDAVOVU; Kul’chyts’kyi et al, *OUN v 1941 rotsi* 256–57)

When Lenkavs’kyi, Shukhevych, and Stets’ko had written up the program, Bandera summoned a courier and instructed him to deliver it to Ivan Klymiv, the *kraiovyi providnyk*, or homeland leader, of the OUN in western Ukraine (Mudryk-Mechnyk, *OUN v Ukraïni* 9).¹⁸ Klymiv, who had been buttressing the underground since early 1940 for an uprising against the Soviets, studied the plan and then drafted two orders. His activists printed and distributed them in L’viv the day that German forces reached the city.

One placard had the heading “Ukrainian People!” (Figure 1). After a long and rambling introduction it got to the matter at hand:

Do not throw away your weapons now. Take them in your hands. Destroy the enemy. . . . People! Know! Moscow, Poland, the Hungarians, the Jews are your enemies! Destroy them! (3833/1/63/10, TsDAVOVU)¹⁹

Klymiv addressed his second placard to “Citizens of the Ukrainian State” (Figures 2 and 3). In it he announced that the OUN(B) had proclaimed an independent state and that all OUN forces were to report to him as the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian National Revolutionary Army. Perhaps because Klymiv drafted several versions or because of retyping by different hands, several versions of his order have survived. They differ in spelling, punctuation, and arrangement, but one passage appears in every version with only slight changes in wording. “I am introducing,” Klymiv wrote:

military Revolutionary Tribunals that will have the right to issue verdicts including the death penalty for all offences against the Ukrainian Nation and the Ukrainian State, against morals and public safety. B) I am introducing the following penalties: the death penalty, the penalty of imprisonment, the penalty of incarceration in a concentration camp, and the penalty of confiscation of property. C) I am introducing mass (family and national) responsibility for all offences against the Ukrainian State, the Ukrainian Army, and the OUN. (“Hromadiany Ukraïns’koï Derzhavy!” 13/376/4/53, HDASBU; “Hromadianam Ukraïns’koï Derzhavy,” 3833/1/41/6–7, TsDAVOVU; “Hromadiany Ukraïns’koï Derzhavy!” 3833/1/41/8–9, TsDAVOVU; “Hromadiany Ukraïns’koï Derzhavy!” 3833/1/63/4–4v, TsDAVOVU; “Hromadiane Ukraïns’koï Derzhavy!” 3833/2/18/86–86v, TsDAVOVU)

The two orders were direct incitements to the pogroms that raged in L’viv on 1 and 2 July 1941, in Zolochiv on 3 and 4 July, and in Ternopil’ from 4 to 6 July.²⁰




Figure 1. An appeal to the "Ukrainian people" from the OUN(B): "Moscow, Poland, the Hungarians, the Jews are your enemies! Destroy them!" (3833/1/63/10, TsDAVOVU).

In late August 1941 Klymiv again demanded the compilation of lists of "Poles, Jews, experts, officers, leaders, and all who are hostile to Ukraine and Germany" and required that slogans be painted on walls and fences (Figures 4 and 5):

We do not want Polish and Jewish landowners and bankers to return to Ukraine.

Death to Russians, Poles, Jews, and other enemies of Ukraine. (Ivan Klymiv, "Instruktsiia ch. 6," 3833/1/46/36—36v, TsDAVOVU; Kul'chyts'kyi et al, *OUN v 1941 rotsi*, 2:452—54, 482—83)




Figure 2. An order to "citizens of the Ukrainian state" from Ivan Klymiv ("Lieutenant Lehenda"): "I am introducing mass (family and national) responsibility for all offences against the Ukrainian State, the Ukrainian Army, and the OUN" (3833/1/41/8–9, TsDAVOVU, p. 1).

Southeast Poland, January 1947: "a sterling invective and lie"

Displeased by Iaroslav Stets'ko's proclamation of a sovereign state on 30 June 1941, the German authorities took him into custody, carted him off to Berlin, and began cracking




Figure 3. An order to "citizens of the Ukrainian state" from Ivan Klymiv ("Lieutenant Lehenda"): "I am introducing mass (family and national) responsibility for all offences against the Ukrainian State, the Ukrainian Army, and the OUN" (3833/1/41/8-9, TsDAVOVU, p. 2).

down on the OUN both in Ukraine and in Germany. In Berlin, where he was held under *Ehrenhaft*, or "honorable arrest," Stets'ko wrote an autobiography for his interrogators. In explaining his political beliefs, he echoed the position on assimilation of Jews that




Figure 4. An order from Ivan Klymiv to compile lists of "Poles, Jews, experts, officers, leaders, and all who are hostile to Ukraine and Germany" and to post the slogan "Death to Russians, Poles, Jews, and other enemies of Ukraine" (3833/1/46/36–36v, TsDAVOVU, p. 1).

Dmytro Dontsov and Volodymyr Martynets' had shaped and added to it some of his own venom. In 1938 he had published a short article entitled "We and Jewry." Jews, he had declared, were supporters of Russian Bolshevism and "fleece, materialists, [and] egotists who demoralize and corrupt the nations of the world."




Figure 5. An order from Ivan Klymiv to compile lists of "Poles, Jews, experts, officers, leaders, and all who are hostile to Ukraine and Germany" and to post the slogan "Death to Russians, Poles, Jews, and other enemies of Ukraine" (3833/1/46/36-36v, TsDAVOVU, p. 2).

Bolshevism, which Jews are now serving in Ukraine, is the creation of the Russian Asiatic, and Ukraine's chief enemy is Moscow, and not Jews, who are Moscow's helpers and as such are vanquished by us in accordance with their true importance. The Ukrainian struggle

is being waged against Moscow and Bolshevism along the first line and against Jewry to the extent that they [*sic*] assist Ukraine's enemies and strive to exploit and corrupt the Ukrainian people.

The main enemies are those who conquered the Ukrainian lands by force of arms and are holding them by force. These are Moscow and its satellites Poland, Romania, and Hungary. Ukraine must destroy Russia and Bolshevism, and in doing so we will also liquidate the main present-day instrument of the Jewish danger to us and the world. (Karbovyeh, "Zhydivstvo i my")

In mid-July 1941, Stets'ko repeated that equivocal declaration:

I consider Marxism to be a product of the Jewish mind, which, however, has been applied in practice in the Russian prison of peoples by the Russian-Asiatic people with the assistance of Jews. Russia and Jewry are Ukraine's greatest enemies and bearers of corruptive Bolshevik international ideas.

And then he cleared away the ambiguity:

Although I consider Moscow, which in fact held Ukraine in captivity, and not Jewry, to be the main and decisive enemy, I nonetheless fully appreciate the undeniably harmful and hostile role of the Jews, who are helping Moscow to enslave Ukraine. I therefore support the destruction of the Jews and the expedience of bringing German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine, barring their assimilation and the like. (Stets'ko, "Mii zhyttiepys," 3833/3/7/5-6, TsDAVOVU; Berkhoff and Carynnyk 162, 170–71)

Stets'ko was not alone in postulating annihilation as the goal of a Jewish policy. In early July 1941, with support from the German army and Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, the metropolitan of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the OUN(B) set up a Council of Elders. Its purpose was to provide Stets'ko's administration with the appearance of broad popular support (Rebet 107; Haivas 269–70). On 18 July the Council took up the question of Jews. Oleksa Hai-Holovko, a writer from eastern Ukraine who had joined the OUN(B) underground, said at that session, "Jews are very insolent. . . . They have to be treated very harshly. . . . We must finish them off. . . . I like the German view very much."

Kost' Levyts'kyi, the president of the council, countered that "the German method for the Jewish question is not very suitable for us. We must examine each case individually."

Stepan Lenkavs'kyi, the Bandera faction's propaganda officer, supported Hai-Holovko. "Regarding the Jews," he said, "we will adopt any methods that lead to their destruction" ("Pro menshyny v Ukraïni," 3833/1/9/1-4, TsDAVOVU; Kul'chyts'kyi et al, *OUN v 1941 rotsi* 337–50).

Lenkavs'kyi was voicing the opinion if not of the Council as a whole, then certainly of a substantial body within it. In a letter to Bandera on 22 July 1941 (like Stetsko, he was now under house arrest in Berlin), the Council pledged "not to allow any despair to steal into our souls even for a moment. We swear to be equally firm and unbending in moments of sorrow, as well as in moments of difficult trials. . . . To live and die under the leadership of the OUN for this cause" (Serhiichuk, *Stepan Bandera* 148–150).

A report to Stets'ko noted that the Council:

has assumed the right to speak in behalf of all Ukrainian citizens. However, it has not taken a single step against our line because the spokesman of the organization, who is always present at the sessions of the Elders, paralyzes all inappropriate initiatives. Beyond that, the Council of Elders allows itself to be used as an instrument of our subjectness and with a certain amount of pressure from our side it manages to rise to a worthy stature. ("Druhovi Stets'kovi Zvit pro robotu v spravi orhanizatsii derzhavnoi administratsii na tereni Zakhidnykh Oblastei Ukraïny," 3833/1/15/3, TsDAVOVU; Kul'chyts'kyi et al, *OUN v 1941 rotsi* 360–61; Serhiichuk, *OUN-UPA* 259)

Throughout the summer of 1941 the OUN(B) promulgated rhetoric about Jews. A page of instructions for propagandists, undated but no doubt from late June or early July, called for posting signs that read, "Long live the German Army," "Long live the Leader of the German people Adolf Hitler," and for counterposing "the idea of Ukrainian Nationalism, as the basis and guarantee of our freedom and our better future, to the fiction and hypocrisy of Russian and Jewish internationalism" ("Instruktsiia propahandy ch. 1," 4620/3/379/34, TsDAVOVU; 299/443-s/1, LNB).

An order signed by the "Plenipotentiary of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" and addressed to peasants and workers, called on them to set up a militia in every village, town, and city, to staff it with "young honest Ukrainians," and to supply it with weapons and blue-and-yellow armbands (Figure 6). The militia would protect government property, assist the German army, especially in eliminating gangs of Bolshevik saboteurs, and carry out the orders of the chief of the community or district. The chief of the community, elected by the community from among the "respectable honest Ukrainians," would:

Carry out the registration and separation of Jews from the Aryan population and use them in physical labor.

Establish a curfew for the Aryan population and a separate one for Jews. ("Ukraïntsi! Seliany! Robitnyky!," 299, 447-s, LNB)

Failure to carry out these orders was to be punished. The death sentence was permissible. ("Ukraïntsi! Seliany! Robitnyky!," 299/447-s/1, LNB)

A long report by the Bandera faction's "Ukrainian Press Service" gave details of fighting between nationalists and Soviet forces in the weeks before and after the German invasion. "Moscow must perish! White or red, tsarist, Soviet, proletarian, Orthodox or godless – it makes no difference!" the bulletin declared. "Let us greet the German army, the most civilized army in the world, which is driving the Jewish-Communist scum from our lands!" (Ukrains'ka presova sluzhba, "Materiialy-informatsii," no. 1, 21 July 1941, 299/489-s/5v, LNB).

A set of instructions for organizing the cities also dealt with the "aliens" in them:

Today . . . the cities must be the center of our strength and development.

We dare not waste time. We must organize the cities, we must renew them, depolonize and dejewify them. We must Ukrainianize our cities. We must build a class of Ukrainian burghers. ("Administratsiini instruktsii," 3833/1/46/57, TsDAVOVU; Kul'chyts'kyi et al, *OUN v 1941 rotsi* 467)

A broadside aimed at workers in the summer of 1941 called on them to keep the "Jewish Bolsheviks" from sabotaging factories and mines.

Just look: do the Jews, the NKVD men, and all the Russian Bolshevik accomplices live in conditions like the ones we live in? No!

Does even one Jew work in a mine, a blast furnace, or a foundry? No! . . .

The Judeo-Bolsheviks betray us, convict us, execute us, and destroy us . . .

Drive the Jews and the Russian Bolshevik plague from our lands! ("Robitnyky Ukraïntsi!," 299/423-s/1–2, LNB)

In mid-July 1941, as German forces advanced across the old Soviet-Polish border, the OUN(B) began directing its propaganda to people in Soviet Ukraine. A placard addressed to "Ukrainian peasants" referred again and again to the "Bolshevik Jewish dictatorship":

Loans, taxes on the collective farm, taxes on your miserable holdings, meat, milk, and egg deliveries – you gave up everything to the Jews while your children were exhausted and



Figure 6. An order by the "Plenipotentiary of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists" to register Jews, segregate them from "the Aryan population," and use them for labor (299/447-s, LNB).

half-starved. For the slightest protest you were exiled to Siberia and the Solovetsky Islands or thrown into prison . . .

You supported millions of idlers, commissars, and Jews with your labor . . . The Jews and Bolsheviks got rich on your bloody work . . .

Ukrainian peasants!...

Take the collective farms and cooperatives into your own hands and drive out the Jews!...

Establish your own Ukrainian national militia. Hand over to the authorities concealed Red spies, NKVD men, and all agents of the Communist Kremlin and traitors to the Ukrainian people! ("Ukraïns'ki seliany!," 299/417-s/1, LNB)

A placard addressed by the OUN(B) to "Ukrainians! Peasants! Workers! Employees!" repeated the slurs against Jews: "The Jewish-Bolshevik clique used terror and subterfuge to seize Ukraine... Jews and faithful agents of Moscow took over all the positions of leadership. They called all the best sons of Ukraine enemies and executed them."

To stop this Jewish-Communist brigandage, to help Ukraine liberate itself, Adolf Hitler, the great leader of the German people, has ordered the steel-clad columns of the invincible German army to set off into battle and to destroy the bloody lair of the Jewish-Bolshevik commune once and for all. The German soldiers have come to us as our friends. In our towns and villages Ukrainians are welcoming them as their liberators...

Ukrainians! Establish in every town and village a Ukrainian militia from the people who are most certain and most dedicated to our people! Arrest the enemies of the Ukrainian people, the mercenaries of the Jewish-Bolshevik commune! Protect the people's property! Punish the plunderers! ("Ukraïntsi! Seliany! Robitnyky! Sluzhbovtsi!," 299/421-s/1, LNB)

A regional OUN(B) leader issued instructions – to be read to members while they were standing at attention – on how to treat Jews and Poles (Figure 7). No one was to say hello to Jews, shake hands with them, or sell food to Poles and Jews. OUN members who did not obey the order would be punished. Those who were not members would be boycotted (Levko Zakhidnyi, "Nakaz ch. 3," 3833/2/3/12, TsDAVOVU).

"For many years," the OUN(B) wrote in a leaflet addressed to young people, "the Communist Bolshevik party, led by Russians and Jews, concealing itself behind the vociferous and beguiling slogans of world revolution and happy life for all workers, has shamefully deceived and exploited you in the interests of predatory Russian imperialism..."

The OUN is bringing you liberation, freedom and a radiant nationally natural life in your own land where there will be:

NEITHER RUSSIAN
NOR JEW
NOR POLE

AWAY WITH FOREIGNERS! ("Ukraïns'ka Molode!," 57/4/370/18, TsDAHOU; Kul'chyts'kyi et al., *OUN v 1941 rotsi* 310–311)

"We were forced to poison children's minds with Jewish internationalism, love for everything Russian, and contempt for our own country, language, literature, and culture," said a leaflet that a group of teachers addressed to their colleagues.

Jews wrote Ukrainian grammars for us. We were told that ... Ukrainian is a corrupt dialect of Russian, that the Russian language is the best in the world.

In theaters and cinemas we were shown productions and films made by Jews in which they ridiculed the best sons of the Ukrainian land while praising Russian tsars and the fiercest torturers of the Ukrainian people...

Yet we, the great army of Ukrainian culture, did not even for a minute forget, even in the terrible bondage of selfish Bolshevism, that we are the heirs to Cossack glory, that we are the most resilient people, whose name is the Ukrainians. Even during the fiercest torture imposed on us by the invaders from the Russian-Bolshevik empire and the Jews, that Judas tribe the whole world curses, we preserved the purity and transparency of our language, the melodiousness of our famous Ukrainian songs.




Figure 7. Instructions by an OUN leader not to shake hands with Jews or to sell food to Poles and Jews (3833/2/3/12, TsDaVOVU).

"Down with mendacious Jewish Communist education!" the teachers went on. "A Ukrainian spirit in Ukrainian schools!"

Let us welcome the German army, the most civilized army in the world, which is expelling the Jewish Communist swine from our land.

Let us help the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under the leadership of Stepan Bandera build a great Independent Ukrainian State. ("Uchyteli Ukraïntsi!," 57/4/370/25, TsDAHOU. See also the similar leaflet "Uchyteli Ukraïntsi!," 299/453-s/1-1v, LNB)

In late July 1941 the OUN(B) issued "organizational instructions" that once again singled out Jews and in this case also Poles:

The housing office in every city must be in our hands. For this purpose take people from the villages because then [we] will control the houses. Explain to the Gestapo that the existing housing offices are once again concealing Polish and Jewish Bolshevik organizations [that are opposed to] Ukraine and Germany.

Prepare and submit to the District OUN Leadership lists of Poles and Jews, their leaders and officers who are conducting an anti-Ukrainian and anti-German action. Add to this appropriate material and protocols . . .

Staff every village, district administration, retail enterprise, factory, and workshop only with Ukrainians. No foreigners should occupy any important positions. Everywhere work for the benefit of the Ukrainian Nation, everywhere order and discipline because this is the order from the blood of the fighters and martyrs, because this is our sacred duty to the Nation. (Okr. provid OUN, "Orhanizatsyini instruksii," 3833/1/46/51, TsDAVOVU; Kul'chyts'kyi et al., *OUN v 1941 rotsi* 464-66)

A second set of "organizational instructions" talked about military training and weapons:

Prepare for training. Carry out training of members.

Help the German authorities in the struggle with Russians, Jews, Poles, and the commune, destroy them mercilessly in total, because they are our enemies. ("Orhanizatsyini instruksii," 3833/1/46/54, TsDAVOVU)

The OUN(B) also targeted Red Army soldiers. "Comrades, brothers!" declared a leaflet issued in late July 1941. "Enough deceit. Enough of listening to Jewish lies and fearing the terror of the commissars and political instructors. Finish with them!"

At home they are deceiving and terrorizing your hungry wives and children, and here at the front they are doing the same to the soldiers. For what and for whom are they driving millions of people to their death? For hunger, poverty, and terror. For the Jews and the commissars! For the terrible Communist bondage!

The leaflet then got to the matter at hand.

The hour of our vengeance has come!

Now the weapons are in the hands of millions of mobilized sons of Ukraine and of the other peoples of the Soviet Union.

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists calls on you, soldiers, to take this opportunity to turn your weapons against the red murderers. Rise up with courage! Turn your weapons around! Throw off the hateful Jewish-Communist yoke! ("Chervonoarmiitsi!," 299/425-s/1, LNB)

The Mel'nyk faction did not lag behind Bandera's men. A broadside entitled "Our Aims," undated but probably published before June 1941, stipulated that "the attitude toward minorities will be determined by their attitude toward the revolutionary struggle of the Ukrainian people" ("Nashi tsili," MG30 C167/vol. 147/file 38, p. 3, LAC).

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The program adopted at the first conference of the OUN(B) in late September-early October 1941 was a change of sorts in its position on minorities. The sovereign state that Stets'ko had

declared had collapsed. And the OUN task forces that had fanned out across central Ukraine had found little sympathy for nationalist slogans. “Our slogans,” said the program, “should not organize the passive, legally non-Ukrainian masses. . . against the Ukrainian liberation movement and bring about. . . national fronts in a civil war.”

We must strive to draw in or at least keep under our influence the entire population of Ukraine without regard to its vernacular and mobilizing it for a struggle not under slogans of struggle with the local Russian population, but against the imperialistic policies of territorially distant and politically hostile Moscow and other imperialisms. (“Instruktsia do perevedennia v zhyttia tsilosty diial’nosty OUN,” 3833/2/1/210, TsDAVOVU; Butko and Kentii 112–13)

That clumsy language meant that the OUN was not to attack Russians. It said nothing about not attacking Jews.

In April 1942 an OUN(B) conference passed a resolution that made a more specific reference to Jews:

Despite [our] negative attitude toward Jews as a tool of Russian Bolshevik imperialism we do not think it expedient at the present moment in the international situation to take part in anti-Jewish actions in order to avoid becoming a blind tool in alien hands and turning the attention of the masses away from the main enemies. (“Nepovnyi tekst postanov II-oï Konferentsii,” 57/4/346/14, TsDAHOU)

In May or June 1942 Ivan Klymiv, who had fallen afoul of Stepan Bandera’s deputy Mykola Lebed’ and had been demoted from homeland leader to military officer, gave instructions to arrange church services and hold clandestine meetings on the first anniversary of the proclamation of sovereignty in June 1941 (Naumenko). The manifesto that the OUN(B) issued for the occasion showed that although it now condemned German occupation policies it was still not restraining its anti-Jewish rhetoric. The leaflet referred four times to “Russian and Jewish Bolshevism” and “Russian and Jewish occupiers,” and it listed Jews as enemies:

. . . we are being exploited not by the landowner or the bourgeois, but by the enemy of national order – the German, the Russian, the Hungarian, the Romanian, the Jew, and the Pole . . .

We smashed the forces of the Russian and Jewish occupier with uprisings, raids, and sabotage. When war finally broke out, we used partisan methods to join in physically destroying him and actively stepped forth under the leadership of . . . Stepan Bandera. (“Slovo Orhanizatsiï ukrains’kykh natsionalistiv v pershu richnyiuiu proholoshennnia samostiinosty Ukrain’s’koï derzhavy u L’vovi dnia 30 chervnia 1941 roku,” 3833/1/63/16–16v, TsDAVOVU; Kul’chys’kyi et al., *OUN v 1942 rotsi* 99–104)²¹

On 21 August 1943, 25 or 26 members of the Bandera faction convened on isolated farms in the northern stretches of the Ternopil’ region to hold a “Third Extraordinary Great Council” (Perepichka 574; Serhiichuk, *Stepan Bandera* 267). The participants gathered in secrecy: the Reich security forces had been hunting down OUN(B) members and killing them or dispatching them to concentration camps. No less significant was the defeat of the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad. The council had gathered to discuss the turn in the tide of the war. The Red Army had defeated the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad, and the OUN now expected that Germany would lose the war on the Eastern Front and that Britain and the United States, either alone or with Germany at their side, would attack the USSR. Moreover, the OUN was of the opinion that Jews had a powerful voice in London and Washington. And it wanted to be on whatever side would fight the Soviets.

Thus the council declared the “full right of national minorities to cultivate their own national culture” and the “equality of all citizens of Ukraine regardless of nationality”

(Orhanizatsiia ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv, Zakordonni chastyny, *OUN v svitli postanov* 112; Kul'chyts'kyi et al., *OUN i UPA v 1943 rotsi* 207). But in a reference to Jews the OUN(B) showed no empathy for their situation or awareness of the resistance, both armed and unarmed, that Yehuda Bauer calls *amidah* (*Rethinking the Holocaust* 26, 120; *Death of the Shtetl* 7):

The Ukrainian people, which does not want to allow itself to be slaughtered without hindrance in the Jewish manner, must put up organized armed resistance to the encroachments of the Bolshevik imperialists. (Orhanizatsiia ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv, Zakordonni chastyny, *OUN v svitli postanov* 101; Kul'chyts'kyi et al., *OUN i UPA v 1943 rotsi* 219)

Two months later OUN(B) leaders set about rewriting the record of their treatment of Jews by ordering the preparation of:

c. Lists that would confirm that the Germans carried out anti-Jewish pogroms and liquidations by themselves, without the participation or help of the Ukrainian police, and instead, before carrying out the executions, urged the Jewish committee or the rogues themselves to confirm with their signatures the presence of the Ukrainian police and its involvement in the actions.

d. Material that would clearly confirm that Poles had initiated and taken part in anti-Jewish pogroms and at the same time that they had served as the hirelings and agents of the Germans in their struggle with Ukrainians. ("Nakaz Ch. 2/43, Oblasnym, okruzhnym i povitovym providnykam do vykonannia," 3833/1/43/9, TsDAVOVU) (Figure 8)

In 1944, after the Red Army had driven the Wehrmacht out of western Ukraine, regional OUN leaders issued a set of "Provisional Instructions" that dealt, in part, with Jews: "No actions against Jews are to be carried out. The Jewish question has ceased to be a problem (very few of them are left). This does not apply to those who actively oppose us" ("Tymchasovi instruktsii," 1/23/931/169, TsDAHOU).

*

Three years later, when the war had ended, units of the UPA, or Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the armed branch of the OUN, began breaking through to the West from "Zakerzonnia," the territories west of the Curzon Line that were inhabited by Ukrainians and had been incorporated into Poland in 1945. An OUN-UPA leader in the region addressed an appeal, in English, to the "brotherly Czech and Slovak nations." "We have never edited nor spread nowhere, from our side, neither here, in Ukraine, nor the more in Slovakia any anti-Jewish leaflets," the leader proclaimed.

In all our political literature, underground revolutionary papers and proclamations, neither now, nor at the time of the German occupation you would seek in vain if only one word directed against the Jews. Like objections are nothing other as a sterling invective and lie.

As well as we have never taken a part in any anti-Jewish actions. (Potichnyj 158)

The English may not have been sterling, but the meaning was clear. In 1930 the OUN's second in command had urged his colleagues to demonstrate that Ukrainian nationalism posed no threat to Jews. The movement had rejected his plea and by 1939 had coerced him into postulating that it was proper to disenfranchise them and to enunciate a policy of ethnic cleansing. Now, after stereotyping, reviling, and abusing Jews for almost two decades, the OUN had decided to ignore, deny, or falsify all that it had said about them.

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


Figure 8. An order by the OUN(B) on 27 October 1943 to compile evidence that “the Germans carried out anti-Jewish pogroms and liquidations by themselves, without the participation or help of the Ukrainian police” (3833/1/43/9, TsDAVOVU).

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Nationalist Discourse of the Interwar Period,” brought to my attention a number of sources that I had not considered.

Notes

1. See, for example, “‘Bandy Dyrektorii,’” *Svoboda*, 2 Mar. 1929: 2, which claimed that “world Jewry” had allied itself with the Russian Black Hundreds and with Russian and Ukrainian Communists to vilify Petliura.
2. On Kushnir and his use of “Dniprians’kyi” and “Bohush” as pseudonyms see Posivnych, *Varshavs’kyi akt* 168, and “Kushnir, Makar,” *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*.
3. Redlich, “Jewish-Ukrainian Relations,” also provides a substantial discussion of Dontsov’s pronouncements regarding Jews.
4. Posivnych, “Vydannia” 8, observes that the author was probably Stepan Lenkavs’kyi or Stepan Okhrimovych.
5. The title page of *Agraryzatsiia* states that it was published by the author (“nakladom avtora”), but an advertisement in Stsibors’kyi, *O.U.N. i selianstvo*, lists the book as a publication of *Rozbudova natsii*.
6. Both Mylianych and Martynets’ admired Dostoevsky and called him “the great Dostoevsky.” See A.V., “Pered sudom prysiaznykh” 171, and Mylianych, “Iaponiia” 177.
7. Martynets’, “Zhydivs’ka problema” 38; *Zhydivs’ka problema* 15, acknowledged Mytsiuk as an expert on the Jewish question.
8. Also printed in Kul’chyts’kyi et al, *OUN v 1941 rotsi* 201–220; Kucheruk and Cherchenko, eds., *Dokumenty i materialy* 8–23; and, with omissions and changes, in Chervak, *Derzhavnyts’kyi chyn* 22–43. Also available at <http://rid.org.ua/?p=379> and <http://chtyvo.org.ua/authors/Stsiborskyi/Konstytutsiya.htm>. See also the copy at MG 30 C167, vol. 147, file 36, LAC.
9. The draft constitution bears no date. Rossolinski-Liebe, “The ‘Ukrainian Revolution’” 4, says that Stsibors’kyi wrote it in 1935, but offers no evidence. Zaitsev, “Did Nazism,” argues that Stsibors’kyi composed the draft in the fall of 1939. Mel’nyk, “Pam’iati vpavshykh” 41, mentions 1940 as the date. Kucheruk and Chervak, *Materialy* 26, say that the OUN(M) State Planning Commission deliberated on the draft in the spring of 1940.
10. The mimeographed copy at LAC bears the notation, “Second edition, February 1941”; the letter itself is dated 10 August 1940. Kosyk does not mention the source of his text.
11. Stsibors’kyi is also named as the author in *Chomu bula potribna chystka v O.U.N.* 3:17, PR1985.0191/64/4, PAA. The dating comes from a communiqué dated 11 Oct. 1940 on pp. 95–96.
12. See also the copy of pt. 3 at MG 30-C167/vol. 147, file 35, LAC. The publication is anonymous and undated. Vynar, “Oleh Kandyba-Ol’zhych” 156, writes that the author was “probably” Iaroslav Stets’ko. Mention of a conversation that took place on 16 Feb. 1941 (3: 23) indicates that the broadside was written after that date, and the statement “before the United States has joined the war” (3: 19) suggests that it was written between June and December 1941. The Germans took Stets’ko into custody in mid-July, but he was apparently able to communicate with fellow members of the OUN(B) until he was transferred to Sachsenhausen in early 1942.
13. For Stets’ko’s denials of hostility toward Jews see Karbovych, “Natsional’ne i internatsional’ne zhydivstvo.”
14. The appeal is undated, but it mentions the assassination of Senyk and Stsibors’kyi and thus was written after 30 August 1941.
15. “Postanovy II. Velykoho Zboru Orhanizatsii ukrains’kykh natsionalistiv,” 1/23/926/192–192v, TsDAHOU; MG 30 C167/vol. 30/file 38, p. 6, LAC. German text in Hunchak, *UPA v svitli nimets’kykh dokumentiv* 33–43. My translation is adapted from Friedman, “Ukrainian-Jewish Relations” 265, and Weiss, “Attitude” 267.
16. On the writing of “The Struggle and Activities” see Stets’ko, *30 chervnia 1941* 50. Mimeographed copies of “The Struggle and Activities” and printed versions of individual sections are located at several archives in Ukraine and the United States. Excerpts have appeared in Orhanizatsiia ukrains’kykh natsionalistiv, Zakordonni chastyny, *OUN v svitli postanov* 48–57; Mudryk-Mechnyk, *OUN v Ukraini* 10–56; Patryliak, “Viis’kovi plany OUN(b)” 127–37; Patryliak, “Zavdannia ounivs’koi propahandy” 129–52; Patryliak, “Derzhavne budivnytstvo” 90–113; Lysenko and Patryliak, eds., *Materialy* 46–90; and Patryliak, *Viis’kova diial’nist’*

- OUN(b) 426–596. Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe's work may draw more attention to "The Struggle and Activities." He argues in "The 'Ukrainian National Revolution' of 1941" and in his forthcoming doctoral thesis, "Stepan Bandera: Deconstructing the Myth of a Ukrainian Fascist" (Universität Hamburg), that without the plan OUN(B) activists would not have known what to do after 22 June 1941.
17. To ensure that these instructions reached OUN propagandists the section was reprinted on Bible paper: Orhanizatsiia ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv, "Borot'ba i diial'nist' OUN pidchas viiny: Propahandyvni vkazivky na peredvoiennyi chas, na chas viiny i revoliutsii ta na pochatkovi dni derzhavnoho budivnytstva," 299/307-s/ and 299/543-s, LNB.
 18. Mechnyk, *U vyri* 7–8, gives a fictionalized account of how Bandera instructed him to deliver "Borot'ba i diial'nist'" to Klymiv.
 19. See also 3833/1/63/12, TsDAVOVU; Kul'chys'kyi et al, *OUN v 1941 rotsi* 2: 575–77; "Ukrains'kyi narode," 299/449-s/1, LNB; and "Ukrains'kyi narode!," 299/470-s/1, LNB.
 20. On the printing and distribution of the orders see Carynnyk, "Jews, Poles, and Other Scum," and Tsarynnyk, "Zhydy, poliaky ta insha svoloch."
 21. See also the copy at 57/4/348/19–19v, TsDAHOU, and the Russian translation at 13/372/35/200–207, HDASBU; Serhiichuk, *Stepan Bandera u dokumentakh* 151–59.

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